How to contact WikiLeaks? What is Tor? Tips for Sources After Submitting

This key's fingerprint is A04C 5E09 ED02 B328 03EB 6116 93ED 732E 9231 8DBA

    -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

    mQQNBFUoCGgBIADFLp+QonWyK8L6SPsNrnhwgfCxCk6OUHRIHReAsgAUXegpfg0b
    rsoHbeI5W9s5to/MUGwULHj59M6AvT+DS5rmrThgrND8Dt0dO+XW88bmTXHsFg9K
    jgf1wUpTLq73iWnSBo1m1Z14BmvkROG6M7+vQneCXBFOyFZxWdUSQ15vdzjr4yPR
    oMZjxCIFxe+QL+pNpkXd/St2b6UxiKB9HT9CXaezXrjbRgIzCeV6a5TFfcnhncpO
    ve59rGK3/az7cmjd6cOFo1Iw0J63TGBxDmDTZ0H3ecQvwDnzQSbgepiqbx4VoNmH
    OxpInVNv3AAluIJqN7RbPeWrkohh3EQ1j+lnYGMhBktX0gAyyYSrkAEKmaP6Kk4j
    /ZNkniw5iqMBY+v/yKW4LCmtLfe32kYs5OdreUpSv5zWvgL9sZ+4962YNKtnaBK3
    1hztlJ+xwhqalOCeUYgc0Clbkw+sgqFVnmw5lP4/fQNGxqCO7Tdy6pswmBZlOkmH
    XXfti6hasVCjT1MhemI7KwOmz/KzZqRlzgg5ibCzftt2GBcV3a1+i357YB5/3wXE
    j0vkd+SzFioqdq5Ppr+//IK3WX0jzWS3N5Lxw31q8fqfWZyKJPFbAvHlJ5ez7wKA
    1iS9krDfnysv0BUHf8elizydmsrPWN944Flw1tOFjW46j4uAxSbRBp284wiFmV8N
    TeQjBI8Ku8NtRDleriV3djATCg2SSNsDhNxSlOnPTM5U1bmh+Ehk8eHE3hgn9lRp
    2kkpwafD9pXaqNWJMpD4Amk60L3N+yUrbFWERwncrk3DpGmdzge/tl/UBldPoOeK
    p3shjXMdpSIqlwlB47Xdml3Cd8HkUz8r05xqJ4DutzT00ouP49W4jqjWU9bTuM48
    LRhrOpjvp5uPu0aIyt4BZgpce5QGLwXONTRX+bsTyEFEN3EO6XLeLFJb2jhddj7O
    DmluDPN9aj639E4vjGZ90Vpz4HpN7JULSzsnk+ZkEf2XnliRody3SwqyREjrEBui
    9ktbd0hAeahKuwia0zHyo5+1BjXt3UHiM5fQN93GB0hkXaKUarZ99d7XciTzFtye
    /MWToGTYJq9bM/qWAGO1RmYgNr+gSF/fQBzHeSbRN5tbJKz6oG4NuGCRJGB2aeXW
    TIp/VdouS5I9jFLapzaQUvtdmpaeslIos7gY6TZxWO06Q7AaINgr+SBUvvrff/Nl
    l2PRPYYye35MDs0b+mI5IXpjUuBC+s59gI6YlPqOHXkKFNbI3VxuYB0VJJIrGqIu
    Fv2CXwy5HvR3eIOZ2jLAfsHmTEJhriPJ1sUG0qlfNOQGMIGw9jSiy/iQde1u3ZoF
    so7sXlmBLck9zRMEWRJoI/mgCDEpWqLX7hTTABEBAAG0x1dpa2lMZWFrcyBFZGl0
    b3JpYWwgT2ZmaWNlIEhpZ2ggU2VjdXJpdHkgQ29tbXVuaWNhdGlvbiBLZXkgKFlv
    dSBjYW4gY29udGFjdCBXaWtpTGVha3MgYXQgaHR0cDovL3dsY2hhdGMzcGp3cGxp
    NXIub25pb24gYW5kIGh0dHBzOi8vd2lraWxlYWtzLm9yZy90YWxrKSA8Y29udGFj
    dC11cy11c2luZy1vdXItY2hhdC1zeXN0ZW1Ad2lraWxlYWtzLm9yZz6JBD0EEwEK
    ACcCGwMFCwkIBwMFFQoJCAsFFgIDAQACHgECF4AFAlb6cdIFCQOznOoACgkQk+1z
    LpIxjbrlqh/7B2yBrryWhQMGFj+xr9TIj32vgUIMohq94XYqAjOnYdEGhb5u5B5p
    BNowcqdFB1SOEvX7MhxGAqYocMT7zz2AkG3kpf9f7gOAG7qA1sRiB+R7mZtUr9Kv
    fQSsRFPb6RNzqqB9I9wPNGhBh1YWusUPluLINwbjTMnHXeL96HgdLT+fIBa8ROmn
    0fjJVoWYHG8QtsKiZ+lo2m/J4HyuJanAYPgL6isSu/1bBSwhEIehlQIfXZuS3j35
    12SsO1Zj2BBdgUIrADdMAMLneTs7oc1/PwxWYQ4OTdkay2deg1g/N6YqM2N7rn1W
    7A6tmuH7dfMlhcqw8bf5veyag3RpKHGcm7utDB6k/bMBDMnKazUnM2VQoi1mutHj
    kTCWn/vF1RVz3XbcPH94gbKxcuBi8cjXmSWNZxEBsbirj/CNmsM32Ikm+WIhBvi3
    1mWvcArC3JSUon8RRXype4ESpwEQZd6zsrbhgH4UqF56pcFT2ubnqKu4wtgOECsw
    K0dHyNEiOM1lL919wWDXH9tuQXWTzGsUznktw0cJbBVY1dGxVtGZJDPqEGatvmiR
    o+UmLKWyxTScBm5o3zRm3iyU10d4gka0dxsSQMl1BRD3G6b+NvnBEsV/+KCjxqLU
    vhDNup1AsJ1OhyqPydj5uyiWZCxlXWQPk4p5WWrGZdBDduxiZ2FTj17hu8S4a5A4
    lpTSoZ/nVjUUl7EfvhQCd5G0hneryhwqclVfAhg0xqUUi2nHWg19npPkwZM7Me/3
    +ey7svRUqxVTKbXffSOkJTMLUWqZWc087hL98X5rfi1E6CpBO0zmHeJgZva+PEQ/
    ZKKi8oTzHZ8NNlf1qOfGAPitaEn/HpKGBsDBtE2te8PF1v8LBCea/d5+Umh0GELh
    5eTq4j3eJPQrTN1znyzpBYkR19/D/Jr5j4Vuow5wEE28JJX1TPi6VBMevx1oHBuG
    qsvHNuaDdZ4F6IJTm1ZYBVWQhLbcTginCtv1sadct4Hmx6hklAwQN6VVa7GLOvnY
    RYfPR2QA3fGJSUOg8xq9HqVDvmQtmP02p2XklGOyvvfQxCKhLqKi0hV9xYUyu5dk
    2L/A8gzA0+GIN+IYPMsf3G7aDu0qgGpi5Cy9xYdJWWW0DA5JRJc4/FBSN7xBNsW4
    eOMxl8PITUs9GhOcc68Pvwyv4vvTZObpUjZANLquk7t8joky4Tyog29KYSdhQhne
    oVODrdhTqTPn7rjvnwGyjLInV2g3pKw/Vsrd6xKogmE8XOeR8Oqk6nun+Y588Nsj
    XddctWndZ32dvkjrouUAC9z2t6VE36LSyYJUZcC2nTg6Uir+KUTs/9RHfrvFsdI7
    iMucdGjHYlKc4+YwTdMivI1NPUKo/5lnCbkEDQRVKAhoASAAvnuOR+xLqgQ6KSOO
    RTkhMTYCiHbEsPmrTfNA9VIip+3OIzByNYtfFvOWY2zBh3H2pgf+2CCrWw3WqeaY
    wAp9zQb//rEmhwJwtkW/KXDQr1k95D5gzPeCK9R0yMPfjDI5nLeSvj00nFF+gjPo
    Y9Qb10jp/Llqy1z35Ub9ZXuA8ML9nidkE26KjG8FvWIzW8zTTYA5Ezc7U+8HqGZH
    VsK5KjIO2GOnJiMIly9MdhawS2IXhHTV54FhvZPKdyZUQTxkwH2/8QbBIBv0OnFY
    3w75Pamy52nAzI7uOPOU12QIwVj4raLC+DIOhy7bYf9pEJfRtKoor0RyLnYZTT3N
    0H4AT2YeTra17uxeTnI02lS2Jeg0mtY45jRCU7MrZsrpcbQ464I+F411+AxI3NG3
    cFNJOJO2HUMTa+2PLWa3cERYM6ByP60362co7cpZoCHyhSvGppZyH0qeX+BU1oyn
    5XhT+m7hA4zupWAdeKbOaLPdzMu2Jp1/QVao5GQ8kdSt0n5fqrRopO1WJ/S1eoz+
    Ydy3dCEYK+2zKsZ3XeSC7MMpGrzanh4pk1DLr/NMsM5L5eeVsAIBlaJGs75Mp+kr
    ClQL/oxiD4XhmJ7MlZ9+5d/o8maV2K2pelDcfcW58tHm3rHwhmNDxh+0t5++i30y
    BIa3gYHtZrVZ3yFstp2Ao8FtXe/1ALvwE4BRalkh+ZavIFcqRpiF+YvNZ0JJF52V
    rwL1gsSGPsUY6vsVzhpEnoA+cJGzxlor5uQQmEoZmfxgoXKfRC69si0ReoFtfWYK
    8Wu9sVQZW1dU6PgBB30X/b0Sw8hEzS0cpymyBXy8g+itdi0NicEeWHFKEsXa+HT7
    mjQrMS7c84Hzx7ZOH6TpX2hkdl8Nc4vrjF4iff1+sUXj8xDqedrg29TseHCtnCVF
    kfRBvdH2CKAkbgi9Xiv4RqAP9vjOtdYnj7CIG9uccek/iu/bCt1y/MyoMU3tqmSJ
    c8QeA1L+HENQ/HsiErFGug+Q4Q1SuakHSHqBLS4TKuC+KO7tSwXwHFlFp47GicHe
    rnM4v4rdgKic0Z6lR3QpwoT9KwzOoyzyNlnM9wwnalCLwPcGKpjVPFg1t6F+eQUw
    WVewkizhF1sZBbED5O/+tgwPaD26KCNuofdVM+oIzVPOqQXWbaCXisNYXoktH3Tb
    0X/DjsIeN4TVruxKGy5QXrvo969AQNx8Yb82BWvSYhJaXX4bhbK0pBIT9fq08d5R
    IiaN7/nFU3vavXa+ouesiD0cnXSFVIRiPETCKl45VM+f3rRHtNmfdWVodyXJ1O6T
    ZjQTB9ILcfcb6XkvH+liuUIppINu5P6i2CqzRLAvbHGunjvKLGLfvIlvMH1mDqxp
    VGvNPwARAQABiQQlBBgBCgAPAhsMBQJW+nHeBQkDs5z2AAoJEJPtcy6SMY26Qtgf
    /0tXRbwVOBzZ4fI5NKSW6k5A6cXzbB3JUxTHMDIZ93CbY8GvRqiYpzhaJVjNt2+9
    zFHBHSfdbZBRKX8N9h1+ihxByvHncrTwiQ9zFi0FsrJYk9z/F+iwmqedyLyxhIEm
    SHtWiPg6AdUM5pLu8GR7tRHagz8eGiwVar8pZo82xhowIjpiQr0Bc2mIAusRs+9L
    jc+gjwjbhYIg2r2r9BUBGuERU1A0IB5Fx+IomRtcfVcL/JXSmXqXnO8+/aPwpBuk
    bw8sAivSbBlEu87P9OovsuEKxh/PJ65duQNjC+2YxlVcF03QFlFLGzZFN7Fcv5JW
    lYNeCOOz9NP9TTsR2EAZnacNk75/FYwJSJnSblCBre9xVA9pI5hxb4zu7CxRXuWc
    QJs8Qrvdo9k4Jilx5U9X0dsiNH2swsTM6T1gyVKKQhf5XVCS4bPWYagXcfD9/xZE
    eAhkFcAuJ9xz6XacT9j1pw50MEwZbwDneV93TqvHmgmSIFZow1aU5ACp+N/ksT6E
    1wrWsaIJjsOHK5RZj/8/2HiBftjXscmL3K8k6MbDI8P9zvcMJSXbPpcYrffw9A6t
    ka9skmLKKFCcsNJ0coLLB+mw9DVQGc2dPWPhPgtYZLwG5tInS2bkdv67qJ4lYsRM
    jRCW5xzlUZYk6SWD4KKbBQoHbNO0Au8Pe/N1SpYYtpdhFht9fGmtEHNOGPXYgNLq
    VTLgRFk44Dr4hJj5I1+d0BLjVkf6U8b2bN5PcOnVH4Mb+xaGQjqqufAMD/IFO4Ro
    TjwKiw49pJYUiZbw9UGaV3wmg+fue9To1VKxGJuLIGhRXhw6ujGnk/CktIkidRd3
    5pAoY5L4ISnZD8Z0mnGlWOgLmQ3IgNjAyUzVJRhDB5rVQeC6qX4r4E1xjYMJSxdz
    Aqrk25Y//eAkdkeiTWqbXDMkdQtig2rY+v8GGeV0v09NKiT+6extebxTaWH4hAgU
    FR6yq6FHs8mSEKC6Cw6lqKxOn6pwqVuXmR4wzpqCoaajQVz1hOgD+8QuuKVCcTb1
    4IXXpeQBc3EHfXJx2BWbUpyCgBOMtvtjDhLtv5p+4XN55GqY+ocYgAhNMSK34AYD
    AhqQTpgHAX0nZ2SpxfLr/LDN24kXCmnFipqgtE6tstKNiKwAZdQBzJJlyYVpSk93
    6HrYTZiBDJk4jDBh6jAx+IZCiv0rLXBM6QxQWBzbc2AxDDBqNbea2toBSww8HvHf
    hQV/G86Zis/rDOSqLT7e794ezD9RYPv55525zeCk3IKauaW5+WqbKlwosAPIMW2S
    kFODIRd5oMI51eof+ElmB5V5T9lw0CHdltSM/hmYmp/5YotSyHUmk91GDFgkOFUc
    J3x7gtxUMkTadELqwY6hrU8=
    =BLTH
    -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

How to contact WikiLeaks? What is Tor? Tips for Sources After Submitting

### Contact

If you need help using Tor you can contact WikiLeaks for assistance in setting it up using our simple webchat available at: https://wikileaks.org/talk

If you can use Tor, but need to contact WikiLeaks for other reasons use our secured webchat available at http://wlchatc3pjwpli5r.onion

We recommend contacting us over Tor if you can.

How to contact WikiLeaks? What is Tor? Tips for Sources After Submitting

### Tor

Tor is an encrypted anonymising network that makes it harder to intercept internet communications, or see where communications are coming from or going to.

In order to use the WikiLeaks public submission system as detailed above you can download the Tor Browser Bundle, which is a Firefox-like browser available for Windows, Mac OS X and GNU/Linux and pre-configured to connect using the anonymising system Tor.

#### Tails

If you are at high risk and you have the capacity to do so, you can also access the submission system through a secure operating system called Tails. Tails is an operating system launched from a USB stick or a DVD that aim to leaves no traces when the computer is shut down after use and automatically routes your internet traffic through Tor. Tails will require you to have either a USB stick or a DVD at least 4GB big and a laptop or desktop computer.

How to contact WikiLeaks? What is Tor? Tips for Sources After Submitting

### Tips

Our submission system works hard to preserve your anonymity, but we recommend you also take some of your own precautions. Please review these basic guidelines.

#### 1. Contact us if you have specific problems

If you have a very large submission, or a submission with a complex format, or are a high-risk source, please contact us. In our experience it is always possible to find a custom solution for even the most seemingly difficult situations.

#### 2. What computer to use

If the computer you are uploading from could subsequently be audited in an investigation, consider using a computer that is not easily tied to you. Technical users can also use Tails to help ensure you do not leave any records of your submission on the computer.

#### 3. Do not talk about your submission to others

If you have any issues talk to WikiLeaks. We are the global experts in source protection – it is a complex field. Even those who mean well often do not have the experience or expertise to advise properly. This includes other media organisations.

How to contact WikiLeaks? What is Tor? Tips for Sources After Submitting

### After

#### 1. Do not talk about your submission to others

If you have any issues talk to WikiLeaks. We are the global experts in source protection – it is a complex field. Even those who mean well often do not have the experience or expertise to advise properly. This includes other media organisations.

#### 2. Act normal

If you are a high-risk source, avoid saying anything or doing anything after submitting which might promote suspicion. In particular, you should try to stick to your normal routine and behaviour.

#### 3. Remove traces of your submission

If you are a high-risk source and the computer you prepared your submission on, or uploaded it from, could subsequently be audited in an investigation, we recommend that you format and dispose of the computer hard drive and any other storage media you used.

In particular, hard drives retain data after formatting which may be visible to a digital forensics team and flash media (USB sticks, memory cards and SSD drives) retain data even after a secure erasure. If you used flash media to store sensitive data, it is important to destroy the media.

If you do this and are a high-risk source you should make sure there are no traces of the clean-up, since such traces themselves may draw suspicion.

#### 4. If you face legal action

If a legal action is brought against you as a result of your submission, there are organisations that may help you. The Courage Foundation is an international organisation dedicated to the protection of journalistic sources. You can find more details at https://www.couragefound.org.

# Submit documents to WikiLeaks

WikiLeaks publishes documents of political or historical importance that are censored or otherwise suppressed. We specialise in strategic global publishing and large archives.

The following is the address of our secure site where you can anonymously upload your documents to WikiLeaks editors. You can only access this submissions system through Tor. (See our Tor tab for more information.) We also advise you to read our tips for sources before submitting.

wlupld3ptjvsgwqw.onion
Copy this address into your Tor browser. Advanced users, if they wish, can also add a further layer of encryption to their submission using our public PGP key.

If you cannot use Tor, or your submission is very large, or you have specific requirements, WikiLeaks provides several alternative methods. Contact us to discuss how to proceed.

How to contact WikiLeaks? What is Tor? Tips for Sources After Submitting

# Vault7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed

Navigation: » Latest version

## 12. Bonus: Capture The Flag

SECRET//NOFORN

# Capture The Flag

('excerpt' missing)

## Setup

On the share (\\FS-01\share\NewDeveloperExercises\CaptureTheFlag) there is a VM Virtual Machine titled "New Developer CTF Capture the Flag Windows 8.1 x64.zip". Copy the zip to your local machine and extract the VM. If VMWare asks, you copied it. The CTF Capture the Flag snapshot sets the baseline for the challenge. If you ever run into issues with the state of the VM Virtual Machine you can always revert to this snapshot and continue the challenges. Next, you will want to register on the CTF Capture the Flag website. Once you have finished registering, you can submit flags as well as view the current scoreboard.

## Submitting Answers

To submit answers, go to the CTF Capture the Flag website and copy the SHA-256 string into the flag submission form. If the SHA-256 is correct you'll see your score updated. If it is incorrect, you'll be notified of the invalid submission.

## Challenge 1: Survey

For this challenge you will be collecting information about the target machine ( CTF Capture the Flag VM Virtual Machine). This is useful for understanding future deployments against a machine. Surveys can reveal many things about a machine and its network.

Challenge 1: To capture this flag you will need to collect the following information about the CTF Capture the Flag VM. All strings should be wide character.

1. Machine GUID

2. User Name
3. Computer Name

4. Installed Applications

5. Network Card MAC Apple Operating System Addresses

6. List of all mounted volumes

7. Process List

Now, have your tool output the survey data (raw) into a file in Desktop\Results\Survey\Survet.txt. Shortly after, you'll have your first flag!

## Challenge 2: File Collection

File Collection is also an important part of what we do. Remember the main goal is to enable the collection of FI. In this line of work we run into limitations that aren't always a problem for normal software developers. Unfortunately, we often run into bandwitdth and/or time constraints when trying to retreive information from a target computer. Thus, when designing or configuring a tool, compression, throttling, collection prioritization, and file flattening are things you should consider.

Challenge 2: Collect all of the files from User #?'s user directory (C:\Users\ User #?) with the extensions *.doc, *.docx, *.xlsx, and *.pdf. You will then need to reconstruct the collected files in the Results\File Collection folder on the Desktop. Maintain all file timestamps.

For example, let's say I collected the following files:

C:\Users\ User #?\Desktop\Passwords.xlsx

C:\Users\ User #?\Pictures\MyContacts.docx

C:\Users\ User #?\AppData\Local\Temp\WhereIKeepMyNukes.pdf

Then, the folder structure in the Results\File Collection directory would look like this:

_C

Users

User #?

Desktop

Passwords.xlsx

Pictures

MyContacts.docx

AppData

Local

Temp

WhereIKeepMyNukes.pdf

**NOTE** Notice that the the results folder on the Desktop is underneath C:\Users\ User #?. Therefore, you will need to make sure you exclude the Results folder from your file collection.

Do not compress or encrypt any of the collected files. When you are done, signal the watcher that all files are collected by setting an event with the name {DEC334AC-E1E3-4582-9D4D-75A6201F053B} (See MSDN: OpenEvent and SetEvent). After your files are validated, your second flag should then appear!

## Challenge 3: Compression and Encryption

Almost all of our tools utilize some combination of compression and encryption. Whenever we're sending data back over the internet, or storing the data for later exfil, it needs to be protected. The type of compression and encryption used is dependent upon many factors and should be decided on a per tool basis. SecureBuffer (or the buffer library) is a library of readily available compression and encryption algorithms (there should never be a need to roll your own compression or encryption - these are very signaturable things). So, for this challenge you will need to download the attached files (ImprovedDummy.exe, PubKey.pem).

Challenge 3: Compress and encrypt the dummy payload to retrieve the flag.

- Download the attached files (ImprovedDummy.exe, PubKey.pem)
- Use SecureBuffer/Buffers Library) to compress the binary using ZLIB compression.
- Encrypt the buffer using RSA Encryption algorithm 4096/AES 256 and the supplied public key
- Dump the buffer into a file (raw) named ImprovedDummy.exe.enc in Results\Compression and Encryption

The watcher on the wall will give you the third flag upon completion.

ImprovedDummy.exe | publicKey.pem

## Challenge 4: Payload Deployment

Many of our tools utilize other processes on the machine (sometimes our own). Since we develop tools to do specific tasks, it is important that many of our tools have the ability to load/kick off other tools.

Challenge 4: Use Windows Management Instrumentation to execute a command.

- See MSDN Microsoft Developer Network Win32_Process and Win32_ProcessStartup
- Take a look at some of the examples of WMI Windows Management Instrumentation online
- Now, execute the process C:\Test\CTF\Dummy.exe with the args Give Me The Flag (4 args) using WMI. You must also execute the command with the Error Mode (Win32_ProcessStartup -> ErrorMode) set to 1 (SEM_FAILCRITICALERRORS).
- Upon executing correctly, your flag should appear.

## Challenge 5: System Monitoring & Manipulation

Sometimes our implants need to react to what is happening on target. This could be recording actions the target is taking or changing what the implant itself does (only exfil data when the target is browsing the internet). Windows often utilizes messages and events to notify stakeholders of certain actions (like if a removable media device has been plugged in).

Challenge 5: Set up a notification hook for HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\CTF.

- Set up a notification hook to receive notifications for any new subkeys
- Every 30 seconds a subkey is generated and is deleted 5 seconds later
- Once you receive the notification, enumerate the CTF Capture the Flag subkeys to find a new value on one of the keys with the key name of "FLAG". The flag is the default value of the FLAG key.

## Challenge 6: Persistence

To maintain access to a machine we want to modify the target machine in a way that our code/binary is re-run after it has been stopped (reboot, logoff, possibly even wiped). To do this we can take advantage of mechanisms that Windows itself uses as well as flaws found in the startup process.

Challenge 6: Use the Task Scheduler, a well-known persistence mechanism, to persist ImprovedDummy across logon/logoff.

- See MSDN Microsoft Developer Network ITaskScheduler (v1.0)
- The ITaskScheduler is a COM interface (a big part of Windows object-oriented design).
- Create a scheduled task that persists C:\Users\ User #?\AppData\Roaming\Persist.exe
- Name the task CTF
- Create a trigger so that the command is run everytime a logon event occurs for User #?.
- Although not required, try to go through and understand all that is happening with the COM calls that are required.

To retrieve the flag, restart the VM.

## Challenge 7: Data Transfer

Once we have taken our surveys and collect our files the next step is getting that data back to IOC. There is no common interface for transferring data. Sometimes it's storing data on removable media and sometimes it's mimicking web traffic. In some cases, we can send data to another process so that it can exfil.

Challenge 7: Assume that the watcher process has a cool technique for mimicking web traffic. Anything that it receives over its named pipe it will forward to the LP Listening Post (listening post) via the internet to an IOC Information Operation Center LP.

- Use the survey code from Challenge 1.
- Connect to the named pipe \\.\pipe\{5A426ADB-11B3-4492-8602-380317833226}
- Send the survey data over the named pipe in a single buffer (no need for multiple writes).

Once the data is received by the LP, the first half of the flag will appear.

To obtain the second half of the flag you will use the Windows Sockets API Application Programming Interface to send the survey data to a real LP.

- Read through the Windows Sockets API Application Programming Interface (Specifically WinSock2)
- Connect and send data to 127.0.0.1 port 27015 ( TCP Transport Control Protocol)
- Once verified, the LP Listening Post will send you "tasking" the tasking is the second half of the flag.

## Challenge 8: PSP Personal Security Product (Anti-Virus) Evasion

Since our code is malicious in nature, PSPs (personal security products) are looking for us. There are many different types of signatures that PSPs use to try to determine whether a binary is attempting to do something malicious. In many cases, we can evade detection by PSPs by understanding how they catch us and creating workarounds that accomplish the same tasks.

Challenge 8: Modify the source of our program so it no longer is caught by the PSP

- Download the attached project, open and compile it.
- Take the compiled release version of the binary and put it on the CTF Capture the Flag VM Virtual Machine and run it. Note that it is caught by Windows Defender immediately.
- Modify the source (to complete the same goal), and bypass the Windows Defender sandbox.
- Once you have passed all of the PSPs checks, running the program should cause your flag to appear.
- Note: It is often simple to defeat PSPs. Especially if you can pinpoint what exactly it is they are flagging you for.

NOTE: Ensure that you build the binary Release_Static

PSPEvasion.zip

## Challenge 9: Execution Vectors

Gaining execution on a machine can be one of the most difficult aspects of a computer operation. Sometimes we'll have exploits that let us gain access without any target interaction and other times we will engineer scenarios in which we can bait the target into allowing us access.

Challenge 9: In this scenario you will perform a DLL Dynamic Link Library Hijack on a portable third-party application.

- Grab a copy of the Sumatra PDF Portable Document Format application (attached)
- Analyze the application using PEBear and/or ProcMon to find the vulnerable DLL Dynamic Link Library name (find a DLL Dynamic Link Library that is looked for in the local/current directory first and has only a few imports).
- Generate your own DLL Dynamic Link Library to use as a hijack for the application.
- Your DLL Dynamic Link Library should also drop and run C:\Test\CTF\DummyDLL.dll using the attached DummyDLL file. Run the DLL Dynamic Link Library by calling LoadLibrary inside of the Sumatra PDF Portable Document Format application.
- Embed Dummy DLL Dynamic Link Library in your Hijack DLL Dynamic Link Library by placing it in the resources (Raptor) or as a byte array in a header file (Melomy).
- Run the Sumatra PDF Portable Document Format application to receive your flag

SumatraPDF.exe | DummyDLL.dll

## Challenge 10: Privilege Escalation

Depending on our execution vector, the context our code is running in when we first gain access to a target may be at a privilege level that blocks us from doing things or obtaining information. That means that we'll need to pair our execution vector with another "exploit" to get us to the privilege level we need.

Challenge 10: In this challenge you will be given background information that describes a vulnerability (known and unpatched by Microsoft) that allows you to bypass UAC User Account Control (go from User level privileges to Administrator level privileges without notifying the user). Use your new-found knowledge of the vulnerability to have your User privileged code gain Administrator privileges.

Background Information

UAC Bypasses : When working with UAC User Account Control Bypasses for Windows 7+ there are a couple of requirements for the target machine. The first requirement is that the user your code will be running as is an Administrator user (not limited, and not a guest), The second requirement is that the UAC User Account Control (User Account Control) level must be at default or below. You will note that both these things are true on the CTF Capture the Flag VM.

Auto-Elevated Processes: Since Windows Vista, Microsoft made modifications to the security process in an attempt to reduce the number of UAC User Account Control prompts. One of the ways it did this was by allowing some processes to be automatically elevated. These auto-elevated process were limited to a select few Microsoft processes. These process must be signed by a specific Microsoft certificate, must specify auto-elevation in their manifest, and must reside in a specific set of locations. When executed by the user, the processes automatically are given Administrator privileges. The user calling the process does not get a return handle to the process it just created (they didn't want to make it that easy).

Artillery
To implement the Artillery UAC User Account Control Bypass (In-House name) we take advantage of the Windows Update Standalone Installer (wusa.exe). This is an auto-elevated process provided to us by Microsoft in System32. The wusa.exe allows for command line options, one of which allows you to extract a CAB file to an arbitrary location. With a little research, we have also discovered that if printui.exe (another auto-elevated process) is moved from System32 to another directory, it has a vulnerability in its DLL Dynamic Link Library loading process. When looking for CryptBase.dll the auto-elevate process looks in its local directory first before looking in System32.
Putting this together we know we can do the following to get the auto-elevated process to load our shim DLL:

1. Write our shim to a user accessible location

2. Write a copy of printui.exe to a user accessible location

3. Call makecab to put each of these files into a cab format

4. Call wusa.exe to extract both files to System32\MUI

5. Call System32\MUI\printui.exe

Now, to complete the challenge:

- Download a copy of the "Shim" DLL
- Embed the shim in your tool - Keep it as a byte array in a header file (Melomy) or in your binary's resources (Raptor)
- Using your knowledge of the vulnerability, move the shim and any other required files to there appropriate locations
- Execute the privilege escalation to see your flag.

PrivEscShim.dll

## Finishing Up

SECRET//NOFORN